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PROOF OF SCIENTER IN CRIMINAL OBSCENITY PROSECUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
VER THREE HUNDRED YEARS AGO, John Milton, in a famous essay
directed against the licensing law then in effect in England, wrote:
They are not skilful considerers of human things, who imagine to remove
sin by removing the matter of sin; for, besides that it is a huge heap
increasing under the very act of diminishing, though some part of it may
for a time be withdrawn from some persons, it cannot from all, in such a
universal thing as books are, and when this is done, yet the sin remains
entire. Though ye take from a covetous man all his treasure, he has but
one jewel left; ye cannot bereave him of his covetousness. Banish all
objects of lust, shut up all youth into the severest discipline that
can be exercised in any hermitage, ye cannot make them chaste
that came not thither so ....
Beginning in 1957 with the landmark case of Roth v. United States,2 and
continuing to the present, the courts and legislatures of this country have
embarked on a determined, if somewhat confused, effort to prove Milton
wrong. The social demand for the enactment and strict enforcement of
obscenity laws, designed to remove both the material and its purveyors from
society, has placed an enormous burden on the courts, which are charged with
interpreting the vagaries of this country's obscenity laws as well as balancing
the need for control of obscenity with constitutional freedoms.
The United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United States1 held that the
protective cloak of first amendment freedom did not extend to "obscenity."
The Court in Roth failed, however, to determine with sufficient specificity what
it meant by the term "obscenity," with the result that the Supreme Court has
been forced on numerous occasions to clarify, analyze, characterize and
finally redefine the meaning of that term.' Consequently, the lower federal
and state courts have been largely preoccupied with the duty of interpreting
the Supreme Court's most recent metaphysical pronouncement on obscenity,
and applying it to fact situations before them.
1 MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644).
2 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3 1d. at 485.
4 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 15 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229
(1972); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 784 (1964); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp.
v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
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However, the issue of obscenity involves much more than a dispassionate
evaluation of the quality of a book, movie, magazine or stage play. It also
involves the real interests of individual defendants-publishers, projectionists,
salesmen, corporate presidents, ticket takers-who are charged with the sale,
distribution or exhibition of allegedly obscene material. A conviction for an
obscenity violation subjects these defendants to possible incarceration, heavy
fines, and almost certain economic disaster.
If the constitutional rights of an individual defendant charged with a
violation of an obscenity statute are viewed, as they should be, i.e., as a prime
concern in the enforcement of obscenity legislation, certain critical issues are
immediately presented. For example, what is the quality of evidence sufficient
to meet the state's burden of proof in a criminal prosecution for violation of an
obscenity statute? Does the nature of the state's burden of proof vary
as the medium through which obscenity is presented changes? Does, or
should, the law distinguish between the types of potential defendants in
criminal obscenity prosecutions? 
5
The crucial issue to which the foregoing questions are all directly or
tangentially related is that of proof of a defendant's scienter in any obscenity
prosecution. Scienter is defined as "the defendant's previous knowledge of a
state of facts which it was his duty to guard against, and his omission to do
which has led to the injury complained of."6
In 1959, in the case of Smith v. California,7 the Supreme Court
determined that the inclusion in an obscenity statute of the element of
scienter was a sine qua non for a valid conviction of a defendant charged
with its violation. Since Smith, the Supreme Court has decided only a handful
of cases in which the question of sufficiency of evidence necessary to sustain
a finding of scienter on the part of defendants charged with obscenity
violations has been presented.'
With this minimal guidance provided by the Supreme Court, the lower
federal and state courts have been forced to promulgate their own evidentiary
sFor example, should different standards be applied to store salesmen or movie
projectionists than to corporate officials charged with obscenity violations?
6 BLACK'S 'LAw DICTIONARY 1512 (4th ed. 1951).
7361 U.S. 147 (1959).
8 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502
(1966); Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In Redrup v. New York, 386
U.S. 767 (1967), the Court held that the materials on review could not constitutionally
be adjudged obscene. However, two members of the Court (Harlan, Clark) would have
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted since, in their view, certiorari was granted
only "to consider the standards governing the application of the scienter requirement
announced in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, for obscenity prosecutions." Id. at 771
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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standards to satisfy proof of scienter in criminal obscenity prosecutions. The
result has been the adoption, both judicially and legislatively, ' of a maze of
precedent and statutory presumptions designed to facilitate the showing
of "constructive knowledge" by the defendant of the nature of the material
he is charged with selling, showing, or distributing.
The purpose of this article is to examine, from both a constitutional and
evidentiary standpoint, the concept of scienter in obscenity prosecutions. The
Supreme Court decisions in this area will first be presented and analyzed.
The judicial and legislative response to these decisions will then be examined.
Finally, some suggestions will be offered regarding a possible resolution of the
problems engendered by the concept of scienter in obscenity prosecutions.
THE SUPREME COURT AND SCIENTER
It has been suggested by several commentators' ° that, prior to the
Supreme Court decision in the case of Smith v. California,1 the element of
scienter was neither a constitutional nor an evidentiary requisite for a
successful conviction of one charged with a violation of an obscenity law. The
dearth of authority cited in support of this assumption suggests, at best, that
the problem of scienter in obscenity prosecutions had not been presented prior to
Smith with sufficient regularity so that a definite standard could be formulated.
There were, however, several Supreme Court decisions prior to Smith
which at least indicated the thinking of the Court on the issue of scienter in
criminal prosecutions in general, 2 and in obscenity prosecutions in particular."
For example, in the case of Nash v. United States,'" which involved a criminal
prosecution for conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act, the defendants
contended that the statute was unconstitutionally vague in that it "contained
in its definition an element of degree as to which estimates may differ, with
the result that a man might find himself in prison because his honest
judgment did not anticipate that of a jury of less competent men."' 5
In dismissing the contention that the statute wrongfully punished honest
misjudgment, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated the following:
9 See ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374 (15) (1966); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.10(2) (McKinney
1967); N.C. STAT. G.S. § 14-189.1(f) (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1.228(4) (1950).
10 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Stand-
ards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Lockhart & McClure]; Note, The
Scienter Requirement in Criminal Obscenity Prosecutions, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791 (1966).
11 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
12 See United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); Nash v. United States, 229
U.S. 373 (1913).
1s Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896).
14 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
15 229 U.S. at 376.
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[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his
estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some
matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine
or short imprisonment, as here, he may incur the penalty of death. 6
In United States v. Wurzbach,7 the defendant was charged with receiving
sums of money from officers and employees of the United States for the
"political purpose" of promoting his candidacy for nomination at a Republican
party primary, in violation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act." In
upholding the validity of the statute against a charge that it was impermissibly
vague, the Court stated:
Whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each other
on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no
one can come near it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and
if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to make him take the risk. 9
In both the Nash and Wurzbach cases, the Court distinguished between
proof of an intent to commit the act, "mens rea," and intent to commit the act
with knowledge that it constituted a criminal offense, holding that, while
proof of the former was an essential element of the crime charged, as to the
latter the defendant acted at his peril.
This distinction was applied in the case of Rosen v. United States,"0 which
was the first Supreme Court decision in which the issue of scienter in criminal
obscenity prosecutions was discussed. The Rosen case, although preceding
Smith and its progeny by many years, remains today a precedent of
considerable importance on the issue of scienter in obscenity prosecutions.2
In Rosen, the defendant was indicted for violating the federal obscenity
mailing statute22 in connection with his ownership and publication of the
11 Id. at 377.
27 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
18 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1925).
'9 280 U.S. at 399.
20 161 U.S. 29 (1896).
21 See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). See also United States v.
Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1973).
2Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, § 3893, 19 Stat. 90 (1876), as amended 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (1958), provided that:
Every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, writing, print,
or other publication of an indecent character,.., and every article or thing
intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use, and every written or printed
card, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving
information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or of whom, or by what means,
any of the hereinbefore mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained or
made,... are hereby declared to be non-mailable matter, and shall not be conveyed
in the mails, nor delivered from any post office nor by any letter carrier; and any
person who shall knowingly deposit, or cause to be deposited, for mailing or
delivery, anything declared by this section to be non-mailable matter, and any
[Vol. 9:1
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss1/6
Summer, 1975]
magazine Broadway. Although the precise nature of the alleged indecencies
contained in the magazine were not detailed by the Court,2 it was stated that
the defendant's modus operandi was to cover the pictures of females appearing
in the publication with lamp black that could easily be erased with a piece of
bread. 2' The indictment charged that the defendant had "knowingly" deposited
the allegedly obscene publication in the mail.
On appeal from his conviction, the defendant first contended that the
indictment was fatally defective in that it failed to allege that he was aware
of the obscene nature of the paper at the time he deposited it in the mail. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating the following:
In their ordinary acceptation, the words "unlawfully, wilfully, and
knowingly" when applied to an act or thing done, import knowledge of
the act or thing so done, as well as an evil intent or bad purpose in doing
such thing; and when used in an indictment in connection with the charge
of having deposited in the mails an obscene, lewd, and lascivious paper,
contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, could not have
been construed as applying to the mere depositing in the mail of a paper
the contents of which at the time were wholly unknown to the person
depositing it.25
More importantly, the defendant also contended that a charge of mailing
obscene matter must be supported by evidence that the defendant knew or
believed that the material could properly be characterized as obscene. The Court
held that proof that the defendant was "aware of the contents" of the magazine
was the measure by which the element of scienter was to be determined.2"
That the Court in Rosen, in holding that "awareness of the contents" and
not "belief in the obscenity of the material" was the appropriate test for
person who shall knowingly take the same, or cause the same to be taken, from
the mails, for the purpose of circulating, or disposing of, or of aiding in the
circulation or disposition of the same, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor....
23 The Court stated that to precisely identify the alleged indecencies "[W]ould be offensive
to the court and improper to spread upon the records of the court." 161 U.S. at 32.
24 d. at 31.
25 Id. at 33.
26 The Court then stated:
The inquiry under the statute is whether the paper charged to have been obscene,
lewd, and lascivious was in fact of that character, and if it was of that character
and was deposited in the mail by one who knew or had notice at the time of its
contents, the offence is complete, although the defendant himself did not regard
the paper as one that the statute forbade to be carried in the mails. Congress did
not intend that the question as to the character of the paper should depend upon
the opinion or belief of the person who, with knowledge or notice of its contents,
assumed the responsibility of putting it in the mails of the United States....
Every one who uses the mails of the United States for carrying papers or publica-
tions must take notice of what, in this enlightened age, is meant by decency, purity,
and chastity in social life, and what must be deemed obscene, lewd, and lascivious.
Id. at 41-42.
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scienter in obscenity prosecutions, did not completely resolve the problem is
obvious. For example, Rosen did not answer the crucial question as to what
type of evidence was sufficient to justify the legal conclusion that the
defendant was "aware of the contents" of the material he was charged
with selling, exhibiting, or distributing. The attempt to resolve that issue
was left to Smith and its progeny.
In Smith v. California,2" Eleazar Smith, a proprietor of a bookstore, was
convicted of the possession in his bookstore of a book found upon judicial
determination to be obscene. Smith was convicted under a Los Angeles City
ordinance which made it unlawful:
... for any person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent
writing, book, pamphlet, picture, photograph, drawing, figure, motion
picture film, phonograph recording, wire recording or transcription of
any kind ... in any place of business where ... books ... are sold or
kept for sale.28
The ordinance included no element of scienter in its definition, and had
been construed by the lower courts as imposing an "absolute" or "strict"
criminal liability.
On appeal,2" the Supreme Court reversed Smith's conviction, holding
the Los Angeles ordinance unconstitutional in that, by entirely dispensing
with the requirement of scienter, it tended to inhibit constitutionally
protected expression.
Justice Brennan, who wrote the plurality opinion in Smith, recognized that,
while proof of mens rea was the rule rather than the exception in American
criminal jurisprudence, there were areas where the states could legally create
strict criminal liabilities without any element of scienter.3 ° But the Court held
that scienter could not be dispensed with in areas (such as obscenity) that
touched on the constitutional right of expression. The Court stated:
[I] f the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents,
and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict the books he
sells to those he has inspected; and thus the state will have imposed a
restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as
obscene literature.... Every bookseller would be placed under an
obligation to make himself aware of the contents of every book in his
27 361 U.S. 147 (1959). For an excellent discussion and analysis of the Smith case see
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 10, at 103-08.
28 Los ANGELES MUN. CODE § 41.01.1.
28 161 Cal. App. 2d 860, 327 P.2d 636 (1958).
30 For example, in pure food and drug legislation, in which the public interest in food
purity warrants the imposition of the highest standard of care on distributors. Cf. United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
[Vol. 9:1
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shop. It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an
approach to omniscience. 1
Having determined that scienter was an essential protection necessary to
avoid the dangers of self-censorship, the Court in Smith was faced with the
argument that this requirement would render the states impotent to regulate
the distribution of obscene material, since proof of a bookseller's knowledge
of the book's contents would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. To allay
this fear, the Court in a crucial passage, through dictum, stated the following:
Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller's persual of a book hardly need be
a necessary element in proving his awareness of its contents. The
circumstances may warrant the inference that he was aware of what a
book contained, despite his denial. We need not and most definitely do not
pass today on what sort of mental element is requisite to a constitutionally
permissible prosecution of a bookseller for carrying an obscene book in
stock; whether honest mistake as to whether its contents in fact
constituted obscenity need be an excuse, whether there might be
circumstances under which the state constitutionally might require that
a bookseller investigate further, or might put on him the burden of
explaining why he had not, and what such circumstances might be. 2
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Smith, found this attempt by the
plurality to delimit the ambit of scienter in obscenity prosecutions to be
unsatisfactory. Recognizing that the Smith case carried implications and gave
directions far beyond its particular facts,3 Justice Frankfurter attempted to
clarify the plurality opinion on the issue of the nature and quality of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of scienter in criminal obscenity prosecutions.
To this end, Justice Frankfurter stated:
Obviously the Court is not holding that a bookseller must familiarize
himself with the contents of every book in his shop.., the Court does
not hold that a bookseller who insulates himself against knowledge about
an offending book is thereby free to maintain an emporium for smut....
[T]he requirement of scienter in an obscenity prosecution like the one
before us does not mean that the bookseller must have read the book or
must substantially know its contents on the one hand, nor on the other
that he can exculpate himself by studious avoidance about its contents. "
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith in the last analysis, raised almost
as many questions as it answered. For example, the Court did not distinguish
31 361 U.S. at 153.
32 Id. at 154.
33 Id. at 161-62.
3 Id.
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between "awareness of the contents" and "awareness of obscenity,""5 thus
leaving the precise status of the Rosen case in considerable doubt. 6 This
doubt created litigation, 7 and the issue was not resolved until the recent case
of Hamling v. United States.3" In addition, the Court in Smith attempted to
establish broad evidentiary guidelines for a showing of scienter. The vagueness
of these guidelines gave, in effect, a carte blanche to those with the legislative
imagination 9 or the prosecutorial zeal"6 to attack the scienter problem within
the ambit of the Smith decision. 1
A case in point is Jacobellis v. Ohio," where the defendant had been
convicted for knowingly possessing an obscene film. The Ohio supreme
court, in affirming Jacobellis' conviction, held that the term "knowingly"
encompassed both scienter and a guilty purpose under Ohio's criminal
obscenity statute."3 Moreover, the Ohio supreme court, noting that the Smith
decision "reserved ... the question as to the extent of knowledge required,""
declared that: "To the dealer in what is commonly known as hard-core
pornography there is little question. Such purveyors of obscenity can be
presumed to know what they are dispensing."'5
On appeal, the issue of scienter, and the judicial presumption announced
by the Ohio supreme court were ignored by the United States Supreme Court
and Jacobellis' conviction was reversed due to the application by the trial
court of local community standards, rather than a national standard, in
determining the obscenity of the film he was charged with possessing. Thus,
35For example, Justice Brennan considered, but did not resolve the question of
"[W]hether honest mistake as to whether its contents in fact constituted obscenity need
be an excuse .... Id. at 154 (emphasis added). And Justice Frankfurter posed the
question: "How much or how little awareness that a book may be found to be obscene
suffices to establish scienter ..... Id. at 161-62 (emphasis added).
3
6See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 9, at 106-08. In fact, none of the opinions in
Smith even cited the case of Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896). This is a
surprising oversight, and one which led commentators to conclude that the test of
scienter in obscenity cases was whether or not the defendant was aware of the fact that
the materials in his possession were legally obscene.
37 See, e.g., Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Brown, 328 F. Supp. 196 (D.C. Va. 1971); State v. Boyd, 35 Ohio App. 2d 147, 300
N.E.2d 752 (1972).
38 418 U.S. 87, at 102 (1974). Here, the Court held, following Rosen, that "awareness
of the contents of the material" was a constitutionally permissible scienter standard in
obscenity prosecutions.
39 See notes 60-115 infra and accompanying text.40See notes 115-71 infra and accompanying text.
41 Thus rendering somewhat ironic the observation by Justice Douglas in Smith that "I
see no harm, and perhaps some good, in the rule fashioned by the court which requires
a showing of scienter." 361 U.S. at 169 (Douglas, J., concurring).
42 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
43 Law of October 1, 1953, ch. 29, § 2905.34 (1953), Ohio Laws (repealed 1973).
44 173 Ohio St. at 25, 179 N.E.2d at 779.
45 Id. at 26, 179 N.E.2d at 790 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 9:1
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the Supreme Court decision in the Jacobellis case did nothing to clarify the
issue of scienter presented by Smith, thus leaving intact the Ohio supreme
court's holding in Jacobellis, i.e., that purveyors of hard-core pornography are
presumed to know what they are dispensing." This case remains Ohio law. 7
In 1966, the Supreme Court was presented with a case whose facts
demanded a resolution of several scienter-related problems that had previously
gone unanswered. In Mishkin v. New York,"4 the defendant had been convicted
of preparing, publishing, and possessing obscene books with intent to sell them
in violation of a New York obscenity statute, 9 which, on its face, did not
require a showing of scienter. Defendant contended, inter alia, that his convic-
tion should be reversed because: (1) the absence of a requirement of scienter
in the statute violated Smith; and, (2) the proof of scienter was inadequate.
The Supreme Court rejected both contentions and affirmed the
defendant's conviction. As to the alleged constitutional infirmity of the statute,
the Court held the absence of a requirement of scienter on the face of the
statute did not render it unconstitutional, since the New York Court of Appeals
in a prior case 9 had authoritatively construed the statute to apply to "only
those who are in some manner aware of the character of the material they
attempt to distribute."'" But more importantly, the Supreme Court in Mishkin
for the first time gave its judicial imprimatur to a set of evidentiary facts
as being sufficient to meet the state's burden of proof on the issue of scienter
in obscenity prosecutions. The Court stated that the following facts sufficiently
established proof of the defendant's scienter:
[A]ppellant's instructions to his artists and writers; his efforts to disguise
his role in the enterprise that published and sold the books; the
transparency of the character of the material in question, highlighted by
the titles, covers, and illustrations; the massive number of obscene books
appellant published, hired others to prepare, and possessed for sale;
the repetitive quality of the sequences and formats of the books; and the
exorbitant prices marked on the books.9
The Court did not attach particular significance to any of these factors,
nor did it indicate whether they were cumulatively or individually sufficient
to establish scienter in a particular case. 3 However, these factors, and
46Id.
47 State v. Saylor, 6 Ohio St. 2d 139, 216 N.E.2d 622 (1966).
48 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
49 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1141 (1909) (repealed by N.Y. PENAL LAW § 500.05 (McKinney
1967).
50 People v. Finkelstein, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 174 N.E.2d 470, 214 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1961).
5 1 1 d. at 345, 174 N.E.2d at 471, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (emphasis added).
52 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 511-12 (1966).
51 But see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), where the Court reaffirmed its
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others, were immediately seized upon by state and lower federal courts as
welcome relief from the apparent strictures of Smith. "
In the case of Ginzburg v. United States,5 the Supreme Court added one
final consideration to the issue of scienter in obscenity prosecutions. In
Ginzburg, the Court held that proof of "pandering"5 of sexually related
materials might be sufficient in a close case to support a finding of obscenity.57
Although the Court in Ginzburg did not specifically determine whether
and to what extent evidence of "pandering" would support a finding of
scienter,58 it became evident that proof of pandering was prima facie proof
of both obscenity and scienter."
The foregoing Supreme Court decisions-couched as they were in broad
generic terms such as, "scienter," "pandering," and "constructive knowledge"-
invited interpretation and clarification by both lower federal and state courts
and legislatures. That response, fueled by the realization that obscenity
was not entitled to first amendment protection, in the end has posed almost
insurmountable barriers to the successful assertion of a scienter defense
in an obscenity prosecution.
THE STATUTORY RESPONSE
The initial effect of the Smith decision was to force a critical examination
and interpretation of existing obscenity statutes in light of the scienter
requirement. In several states, obscenity statutes which failed to specifically
include a scienter requirement in the statutory language were invalidated.""
This result occurred, however, in a minority of jurisdictions.
approval of the general "knowledge of the contents" test as a sufficient test of scienter.
Id. at 644-45.
54 See notes 115-71 infra and accompanying text.
s 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
56 The Court defined pandering as "an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornogra-
phy... through pervasive -treatment or description of sexual matters." Id. at 475-76.
57 Id. at 476-78. Among the significant evidentiary factors supporting a finding of pander-
ing was the fact that the mailing addresses for defendant's publications included: "Blue
Ball, Pa .... Intercourse, Pa.," and "Middlesex, N.J."
51 Id. at 467 n.8. The scienter issue was not presented to the Court in Ginzburg, since
the parties had stipulated to scienter prior to trial.
59See, e.g., United States v. Pinkus, 333 F. Supp. 928 (C.D. Cal. 1971); People v.
Sarnblad, 26 Cal. App. 3d 801, 103 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1972); People v. Bloss, 27 Mich.
App. 687, 184 N.W.2d 299 (1970).
60See State v. Kuebel, 241 Ind. 268, 172 N.E.2d 45 (1961); People v. Villano, 369
Mich. 428, 120 N.W.2d 204 (1963); State v. Burton, 349 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1961);
State v. Griffith, 174 Ohio St. 553, 190 N.E.2d 907 (1963); State v. Wetzel, 173 Ohio
St. 16, 179 N.E.2d 773 (1962); Cincinnati v. Marshall, 172 Ohio St. 280, 175 N.E.2d
178 (1961); Ellenburg v. State, 215 Tenn. 153, 384 S.W.2d 29 (1964); State v. Grump,
57 Wash. 2d 224, 356 P.2d 289 (1960), which declared the Indiana, Michigan, Missouri,
Ohio, Tennessee and Washington state statutes and/or city ordinances unconstitutional
for failing to expressly require scienter.
[Vol. 9:1
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In most instances, existing statutes and ordinances were and have
been construed so as to require scienter. Basically, two approaches have been
implemented to preserve the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances under
Smith. In the first place, courts have construed existing statutes and ordinances
to require proof of scienter, thus incorporating scienter as an "implied element"
in the statutory scheme.6 This approach has also been used to sustain the
validity of federal obscenity statutes. In United States v. Zacher,62 the district
court construed 18 U.S.C. Section 1462-the interstate transportation of
obscenity statute-as containing the "implied element" of scienter. 3 And in
Tallman v. United States,64 the Seventh Circuit upheld a conviction for
uttering obscene language over a radio communication, by construing the
applicable federal statute to "impliedly require" proof of scienter. 5
The second approach adopted by many courts has been to construe
existing statutory language as sufficient to indicate a legislative intent to make
scienter an essential element of the crime. Thus, courts have invariably
construed the words "knowingly,""6 and "intentionally,""7 and "wilfully and
lewdly"6" to satisfy the Smith scienter requirement, and to authorize
convictions based on proof of either actual or constructive knowledge. 9
6 1 See. e.g., Amato v. Ruth, 332 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Engstrom v. Robinson.
317 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Ala. 1970); Cohen v. State, 125 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1960);
Demetropolos v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 658, 175 N.E.2d 259 ( 1961); State v. Oman,
261 Minn. 10, 110 N.W.2d 514 (1961); State v. Hudson Co. News Co., 35 N.J. 284,
173 A.2d 20 (1961); State v. Jackson, 224 Ore. 337, 356 P.2d 495 (1960); State v.
Chobot, 12 Wis. 2d 110, 106 N.W.2d 286 (1940).
62 332 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
63 Id. at 884. The court relied for this principle on Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d
107, 117 (Ist Cir. 1952), a pre-Smith case.
64 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972).
65 The statute involved was 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1948), which provides: "Whoever utters
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."6 6 See United States v. Marks, 364 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ky. 1973); ABC Books. Inc. v.
Benson, 315 F. Supp. 645 (M.D. Tenn. 1970); Newman v. Conover, 313 F. Supp. 623(N.D. Tex. 1970); Great Speckled Bird of Atlanta Cooperative Project v. Stynchcombe.
298 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1969); State v. Jackson, 224 Ore. 337, 356 P.2d 495
(1960).
67 See Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969):
State v. Roufa, 241 La. 474, 129 So. 2d 743 (1961).68 See People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947).
69 Of course, the required scienter, however worded, must relate to an activity, i.e., traffic
in obscenity, that is not constitutionally protected. It is now well-settled that the mere
knowing possession of obscene material cannot be punished. Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969). See also Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. 1969), wherein an
Indiana obscenity statute prohibiting the "knowing possession of obscene material" was
invalidated since it purported on its face to include material in the hands of "[Pirofessors
and researchers in psychology, law, anthropology, art, sociology, history, literature and
related areas. This prohibition is so sweeping as to put in violation of the law the famous
Kinsey Institute at Indiana University." Id. at 67.
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Moreover, several courts have strictly construed the Smith case as
mandating scienter only where books or booksellers are involved, and have
upheld statutes dispensing entirely with scienter when the alleged obscenity
occurs in a different medium, such as films or motion pictures. In Hosey
v. City of Jackson 0 and McGrew v. City of Jackson," the plaintiffs sought
injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the enforcement of a state obscenity
statute which entirely dispensed with scienter." In upholding the statute
despite the absence of any scienter requirement, the court in Hosey, after
examining the Smith decision, flatly held that:
Such reasoning simply does not apply to motion pictures. It would be
impossible for a book dealer to familiarize himself with the contents
of all the books he offers for sale, and proof of guilty knowledge would
certainly be a condition precedent to conviction. The exhibitors of motion
pictures, however, cannot seriously contend any lack of knowledge of
the contents of a particular film. It is relatively easy and also the
responsibility of film exhibitors to preview a motion picture before
releasing it for public showing ....
The court in McGrew summarily rejected the lack of scienter argument
by finding that it was "purely and simply another obscenity case. . ." in which
the plaintiffs were seeking "to escape from their plight by claiming sensitive
first amendment rights of free speech. ' 4
While it is true that the fact of scienter might be less difficult to prove as
the medium through which allegedly obscene matter is portrayed changes, it is
a far different matter to dispense with the requirement and proof of scienter
altogether. It is submitted that the Hosey and McGrew cases represent
unwarranted and unconstitutional extensions of the Smith doctrine. Under
the Hosey-McGrew rationale, a ticket-taker in a theatre could be convicted
under the statute, notwithstanding the fact that it may have been the
employee's first day on the job! 71
In addition to inviting judicial interpretation and construction of existing
obscenity statutes in an effort to find therein the required element of scienter,
the Smith decision has promoted the enactment of new statutory schemes
70 309 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. Miss. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) for reconsideration
in light of Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
"1307 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Miss. 1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
72 Miss. CODE ANN. Ch. 213, § 2286 (1920).
73 309 F. Supp. at 532.
,4 307 F. Supp. at 758-59 n.6.
75 A case in point is State v. Plant, No. B-732801 (C.P. Ohio, 1974) (unreported),
wherein a ticket taker at a theater showing "Deep Throat" was acquitted of an obscenity
charge on the grounds that it was her first day on the job.
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which have attempted in diverse, and in many cases unique, ways to resolve
the scienter problem.
The legislatures of several states"6 have, for example, passed obscenity
statutes which define "knowingly" in language establishing a "reckless
disregard" standard for evaluating the defendants' scienter. South Carolina's
obscenity law defines "knowingly" as:
... having knowledge of the contents of the subject matter or failing
after reasonable opportunity to exercise reasonable inspection which
would have disclosed the character of such subject matter.7
And Texas' obscenity law provided that:
A person shall be deemed to have constructive knowledge of the
contents if he has knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable
and prudent man on notice as to the suspect nature of the material."8
The "reckless disregard" standard has been tested and sustained by the
courts," which have relied on Frankfurter's dictum in Smith that one could
not "insulate" himself from knowledge about a particular book and escape
criminal liability."0 In State v. Watkins,8 the defendant challenged the South
Carolina "reckless disregard" standard on the ground, inter alia, that it
"enticed" him to attempt to justify his conduct in violation of the fifth
amendment right not to testify. The Court rejected this argument, stating
that the defendant's fear was "more imagined than real. The requirement is
not impermissibly burdensome."8
And in Morris v. United States,8 the Court, in affirming the convictions
of the manager and a dancer at a local nightclub for violating a District of
Columbia obscenity statute, 4 held that: "[T]he statute allows the appellants
to remain ignorant of the illegality of the performance only at their peril, once
they knew or had reason to know that they might be violating the statute."8' 5
In addition to the "reckless disregard" scienter statutes, the legislatures
of several states have enacted obscenity statutes which create statutory
76 See notes 77, 78 and 84 infra for a discussion of several such statutes.
17 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-414.1(d) (1962).
78 Law of 1943, ch. 35 § 1 (1943) Tex. Laws (repealed 1973).
79See Movies, Inc. v. Conliski, 345 F. Supp. 780 (N.D. 111. 1971); Morris v. United
States, 259 A.2d 337 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1969); State v. Watkins 259 S.C. 185, 191
S.E.2d 135 (1972); State v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1970).
8o 361 U.S. at 161-62.
81 259 S.C. 185, 191 S.E.2d 135 (1972).
82 Id. at 193, 191 S.E.2d at 143.
83 259 A.2d 337 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1969).
14 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2001 (Supp. 1969).
85 259 A.2d at 339.
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exemptions from criminal prosecution for certain classes of potential
defendants.8" Most common among the exempted classes are motion picture
operators, and projectionists. The statutory exemption does not apply,
however, to any defendant who has a "financial interest" in the place of
employment. Nor does it apply to a defendant whose duties exceed those
of the exempt class. In general, courts have strictly construed these exemption
statutes.8" The impetus for this legislation probably came from the difficulty
of proof of scienter when certain classes of employees are involved.
Perhaps the most controversial legislation in the obscenity-scienter area
has involved the enactment of obscenity statutes which create a presumption
of scienter upon proof of the possession, by a person, of a specified number of
copies of certain obscene materials. Among the states which have enacted
such statutes are North Carolina,88 New York,8" Ohio,9" Florida,91 and
Virginia.9" The constitutionality of these statutes has been extensively tested
in the courts, and the results have been diverse.
In Shinall v. Worrell,9" the plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring certain
portions of the North Carolina obscenity statute unconstitutional. The
statute provided for two presumptions regarding scienter:
(1) That a person who knowingly possessed more than three copies of
obscene material was presumed to have the purpose to disseminate
obscenity unlawfully;9" and
(2) That a person who disseminates obscenity was presumed to know
the existence of the parts, pictures or content of the material
which rendered it obscene.9"
8 6 CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(b) (West 1970); Law of 1943, ch. 35, § 1 (1943) Tex.
Laws (repealed 1973); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.010 (1969). Illustrative of these
statutes is § 311.26 of the California Penal Code, which provides:
The provisions of this section with respect to the exhibition of, or the possession
with intent to exhibit, any obscene matter shall not apply to a motion picture
operator or projectionist who is employed by a person licensed by any city or
county and who is acting within the scope of his employment, provided that such
operator or projectionist has no financial interest in the place wherein he is so
employed.
87 People v. Stout, 18 Cal. App. 3d 172, 95 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1971); West v. State, 489
S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973); State v. J-R Distributors, Inc.. 82 Wash. 2d 584. 512
P.2d 1049 (1973).
88 Law of 1885, ch. 125 § 3731 (1885) N.C. Laws (repealed 1971).
§ 14-189.1(d) (1965).
89 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.10(2) (McKinney 1967) requires six copies.
90 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905-38(A) (Page 1970) requires six copies.
91 FLA. STAT. § 847.06(2) (1973) requires two identical copies or five total copies.
92 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-228(4) (as amended, 1962) requires one item.
93 319 F. Supp. 485 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
94 Law of 1885, ch. 125 § 3731 (1885) N.C. Laws (repealed 1971).
95 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1(f) (1965). Id.
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The court in Shinall found both presumptions to be unconstitutional. As to
the presumption of a purpose to disseminate from the fact of possession, the
court found this defective in that there was no rational basis from which
to assume that the presumed fact (guilty purpose) flowed from the proven
fact (possession). As to the presumption of scienter from the fact of
dissemination, the court found this unconstitutional because of its tendency
to inhibit constitutionally protected expression."
Interestingly, this latter presumption was later upheld by the North
Carolina Appellate Court in State v. McCluney,97 on the grounds that the
statutory presumption of scienter was not absolute. Rather the court found
that it was merely evidentiary, so as to permit, but not require, a finding of
scienter. Although the court in McCluney was persuaded by the fact that the
presumption of scienter was evidentiary and rebuttable, courts in several other
jurisdictions have found constitutional deficiencies inherent in "evidentiary"
presumptions of scienter.
In Morrison v. Wilson,s the court held that even a rebuttable presumption
of scienter in Florida's obscenity statute 9 was unconstitutional in that:
The presumption on its face violates the due-process clause, and the
privilege an accused enjoys against being compelled to testify in a
criminal case found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.1"'
Further, in Grove Press, Inc. v. Evans,"' a federal district court in
Virginia held unconstitutional a statutory presumption providing that:
"Possession in public or in a public place of any obscene item as defined in this
article shall be deemed prima facie evidence of a violation of this section." 102
The court in Grove Press determined that this presumption was deficient in
that it would "impute to every ultimate purchaser the intent to sell the
item." The court then found that the presumption "arbitrarily embraces a
conscientious retailer who seeks to weed out ... obscene publications delivered
to him by his wholesaler ... ."11'
96 3f9 F. Supp. at 491.
17 11 N.C. App., 180 S.E.2d 419 (1971).
98 307 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Fla. 1969).
99 FLA. STAT. § 847.06(2) (1973).
100 307 F. Supp. at 199. Following this decision, the Florida legislature in 1971 enacted
FLA. STAT. § 847.011 (b), which provides that: "The knowing possession by any person
of six or more identical or similar materials, matters, articles or things coming within the
provisions of the foregoing paragraph (a) is presumptive evidence of the violation of
said paragraph." There is no reported decision testing the validity of this statute.
101 306 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Va. 1969).
102 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-228(4) (1962).
103 306 F. Supp. at 1088. See also House v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 121, 169 S.E.2d
572 (1969).
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The statutory scienter presumptions which have been most frequently
tested in the courts to date are those of New York's obscenity statute,
which provides:
(1) A person who promotes obscene material; or possesses the same
with intent to promote it in the course of his business, is presumed
to do so with knowledge of its content and character.
(2) A person who possesses six or more identical or similar obscene
articles is presumed to possess them with intent to promote the same.1" '
These presumptions have been consistently upheld as valid by the state
and federal courts of New York. °0 In People v. Kirkpatrick,"6 the managers
of two bookstores had been charged and convicted of promoting obscene
material, with the evidence of scienter being supplied by the allegedly
unrebutted statutory presumptions of scienter.' °' The defendants both owned
large-volume bookstores, with one store carrying more than 10,000 different
titles and 25,000 volumes of hard-cover and paperback books, while the other
handled over 16,000 titles and from 50,000 to 60,000 volumes. 0 8 Despite the
fact of the large-volume business, and the testimony of both defendants that
they had ordered the material "blind" and had never read or discussed its
contents with anyone, the appellate court affirmed the convictions. The court
construed the statutory presumption of scienter as being rebuttable, but
conceded that even a rebuttable presumption has a greater evidentiary effect
than a permissible inference based on probabilities, because the presumption
would require less in the way of probabilities to support it.' The court
held, however, that the presumptions were properly applied to the defendants
by the trial court. In addition the court rejected the "volume of business" as
a factor negating scienter." °
The court in Kirkpatrick thus espoused a theory that, since "sound busi-
ness practice" requires every bookseller to know his stock in order to survive
economically, a rebuttable presumption that he did know it is constitutionally
104 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.10 (McKinney 1967).
105 Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 436 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1970); Milky Way Productions,
Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y., 1969), aff'd per curiam, sub. norn., New
York Feed Co., Inc. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970); People v. Hey, 71 Misc. 2d 155, 335
N.Y.S.2d 550 (Chautauqua Co. Ct. N.Y. 1972).
10632 N.Y.2d 17, 295 N.E.2d 753, 343 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1973).
107 32 N.Y.2d at 28, 295 N.E. at 759, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (1973) (Fuld, J., dissenting). In
fact, the only evidence introduced at trial was that given by the purchasing police officers,
that they had bought the magazine (Zap Comix No. 4), which contained the legend
"Adults Only" on its cover, for 50 cents. 32 N.Y.2d at 28, 295 N.E.2d at 759, 343
N.Y.S.2d at 79 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
108 Id.
109 32 N.Y.2d at 25, 295 N.E.2d at 757, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
110 Id.
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justified. This rationale is an unwarranted and unconstitutional departure from
the principles of the Smith case. In the first place, the Smith decision was predi-
cated on the inhibiting effect that absolute liability obscenity statutes would
have on first amendment rights, and was decided for the express purpose of
eliminating problems of self-censorship inherent in such statutes. However, a
statute which makes a presumption of scienter rebuttable is no less effective as
a restraint. In either case, the bookseller is forced to become a censor, and the
state is thus able to indirectly suppress what it could not suppress directly.
Secondly, the statutory presumption of scienter in obscenity cases
inherently compels the defendant to testify in his own behalf in order to rebut
the presumption in violation of the constitutional right of an accused not to
testify. In taking the stand, a defendant runs the risk of supplying the prosecu-
tion with the evidence necessary to sustain a finding of "actual knowledge,"
even apart from the presumption of scienter. 11' That these arguments
have to date been rejected indicates the insensitivity of some courts (and
legislatures) to the rights of the accused in criminal obscenity prosecutions.
However, other states have enacted criminal obscenity statutes designed
to insure that a criminal obscenity conviction is obtained only upon a
finding of actual knowledge of, or notice to, the defendant. Illustrative
of this type of statute is that of Alabama, which precludes any criminal
prosecution for violation of the obscenity statutes:
[U]nless the accused is first served with prior written notice that there
is reasonable cause to believe the material upon which such prosecution is
based violates this chapter, and the accused has, after receiving such
notice violated this chapter.'12
This statute has been strictly construed by the Alabama courts. In Bush
v. City of Tuscaloosa,"3 the conviction of a movie projectionist for violating
a city obscenity ordinance was reversed on appeal, where the statutory
notice had been sent to the manager of the theatre. The appellate court
held that notice to the manager could not be deemed notice to the projectionist
charged with violating the ordinance.
Ohio has a hybrid form of "notice" statute."' Under the Ohio statute,
receipt of actual notice, in writing from the prosecuting attorney that certain
The appellate court in Kirkpatrick in fact held that the trial court correctly found
that the defendants had actual knowledge of the contents of the magazines they were
charged with promoting, in spite of the fact that the only testimony on the scienter issue
was introduced by the defendants after they had taken the stand to rebut the statutory
presumption of scienter!
112 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(16m) (a) (Supp. 1973).
13 276 So. 2d 629 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973).
114 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.38(B) (Page 1970).
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material or performances are obscene, operates as a presumption of scienter in
a later criminal prosecution. This "notice" only applies to "an owner or
manager of a theatre, bookstore, magazine stand, or other commercial
establishment engaged in the business of selling materials or exhibiting
performances."'" In addition, under Ohio's notice statute, the notice need
not be personal-it can be effected by publication in a journal of general
circulation in the county or city involved.
There is then considerable variety in the statutory schemes enacted
pursuant to the Smith decision. These statutes have, in general, been upheld
by the courts as a valid exercise of the states' power to limit obscenity.
However, it is not in the area of statutory interpretation, but in the area of
evidentiary standards, that the most significant pronouncements on the
requirement of scienter in criminal obscenity prosecutions have emerged.
PROOF OF SCIENTER
Obviously, the most compelling and positive proof of a defendant's scienter
in an obscenity case consists of testimony, of the defendant's statements or
admissions regarding the material he is charged with selling, exhibiting,
or distributing. In many instances, this is the only direct proof of scienter. To
secure this type of evidence, law enforcement agencies frequently employ
detectives and undercover agents to enter a bookstore or theatre, and elicit
damaging statements and admissions by the proprietor or employee about the
material in question, prior to its seizure and the defendant's arrest. The admis-
sion of these statements at trial is usually conclusive on the issue of scienter.
In People v. Finkelstein,"6 a detective who purchased two allegedly
obscene books from the defendant's store told the defendant that the books
were pornographic. The defendant responded: "I have seen much worse
than this."'17 The court considered this voluntary admission, coupled with the
obscenity of the books in question, as conclusive on the issue of scienter 18
And in Kramer v. United States,"9 an employee was questioned by an
undercover agent in the store as to the respective merits of several films in the
store. The employee's remark that one film "was the better one" was held by
the court to be positive proof of scienter, notwithstanding other testimony
that it was the employee's first day on the job.' Similarly, statements elicited
from defendants by police agents that the material "showed everything, '21
115 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.38(B) (1970).
I 11I N.Y.2d 300, 183 N.E.2d 661, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1962).
117 Id. at 303, 183 N.E.2d at 663, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
118 Id. at 304, 183 N.E.2d at 664, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
119 293 A.2d 272 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1972).
120 id. at 273, 274.
121 State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1965).
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that the defendant had "dirtier books,""12 that the books would "excite
him," 122 and that the books were "real good ones" 124 have been held probative
of the defendant's actual knowledge of the material.
The elicitation and use of this type of testimony in criminal obscenity
prosecutions raises several interesting issues. For example, can a defendant
from whom damaging statements and admissions have been obtained claim
that he has been entrapped? This defense has often been raised and, with
one exception,'25 has been uniformly rejected by the courts.'26
Another question raised by the elicitation of damaging statements through
the use of undercover agents is whether or not such statements are suppressible
due to the failure to give the Miranda warnings. 12 7 The only case which has
extensively considered this issue is United States v. Knight.12 8 In Knight,
several New York detectives on October 7, 1965, observed Knight and his
wife walking toward their car in a suspicious manner, and the detectives
approached Knight and asked for his registration and license. Knight produced
a rental agreement showing that the car had been leased from a California
rental agency, but that the car was two weeks overdue. Under California law,
any person who fails to return a vehicle within five days after it is due is
presumed to have embezzled it.
Knight persuaded the detectives to accompany him to his apartment to
confirm the fact that he had the car with the lessor's permission. Upon their
arrival at Knight's apartment, the detectives observed a projector and screen
set up, with film in the projector. Afer confirming the fact that the car was
indeed "overdue," the detectives asked Knight what kind of films were in the
projector. No Miranda warnings had been given at this point. Knight responded
that the films were "dirty, as dirty as they can be,""' and proceeded to
exhibit the films at the detectives' request. The detectives also found other
pornographic photographs in a subsequent search of the room and Knight was
then arrested for grand larceny and possession of pornographic material."'
122 State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91, 447 P.2d 304 (1968).
1
2
3 State v. Von Cleef, 102 N.J. Super. 102, 245 A.2d 495 (1968).
124 Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 502 F.2d 419 (1974).
125 United States v. Kros, 296 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1969), wherein the defendant was
found not guilty, by reason of entrapment, of sending obscene matter through the mail
where government actively promoted the commission of the crime in question, first by
placing its own enticing ad in a magazine and then maneuvering to insure that defendant,
who had answered ad, would use the mail to deliver obscene films instead of exchanging
them at personal meetings.
126 See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 792 (1961).
127 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
128 395 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 930 (1969).
129 Id. at 972.
130 Knight was indicted, inter alia, for interstate transportation of pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465.
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Subsequent to the arrest the city detectives called the F.B.I., and an agent
came to the apartment, removed Knight's handcuffs, advised him of his
constitutional rights, and was told by Knight that the film and photographs
had been transported by Knight from California to New York. At trial, Knight
unsuccessfully attempted to exclude his statement to the F.B.I. agent claiming
that it was tainted because of the earlier failure of the city detectives to warn
him properly of his constitutional rights.' The appellate court affirmed
Knight's conviction assuming that even if the defendant's earlier statements
were improperly elicited without adequate constitutional warnings, there was
no "causal relation" between them and the later statements to the F.B.I. agent.
In addition, the court held that no "coercive atmosphere" surrounded the
defendant at the time the statements were made. 3 '
Despite the Knight holding, one can easily visualize circumstances in
which the elicitation of incriminating statements about the nature of the material
possessed or offered for sale, would be inadmissible without Miranda advice.
For example, a "coercive atmosphere" would certainly be present if a bookstore
owner or operator responded to police interrogation about his knowledge of
the contents of allegedly obscene material, while a police raid on the premises
was in process pursuant to a court order. And incriminating statements would
certainly be inadmissible, absent prior constitutional warnings, if a bookseller
were arrested prior to questioning by police. Thus, an attorney faced with the
use of incriminating statements by his client, in an obscenity prosecution, is
well-advised to seriously evaluate the circumstances and atmosphere in which
those statements were elicited. If those circumstances indicate that the
incriminating statements were made in a "coercive atmosphere," a pre-trial
motion to suppress the statements would be warranted. 3 '
In addition to the defendant's direct statements to police or undercover
agents concerning the nature of material he sells or exhibits, courts have
frequently admitted advertising and signs as circumstantial evidence of scienter.
The marking of an entrance or a certain portion of a bookstore as for
"Adults Only" has been frequently held admissible to prove scienter."' And
a sign in a bookstore stating that "You must be 21 to purchase," has been
held to give rise to the reasonable inference that the defendant was aware
131 Defendant relied primarily on Westover v. United States, 384, U.S. 436, 494 (1966),
a companion case to Miranda.
132 395 F.2d at 975.
133 In Ohio, any objection to the admissibility of a defendant's statements must be raised
by motion prior to trial or it is waived. Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(B) (3). 12(G).
134 See People v. Adler, 25 Cal. App. 3d 24, 100 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1972); People v. Harris,
192 Cal. App. 2d 887, 13 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1961); Cherokee News and Arcade, Inc. v.
State, 509 P.2d 917 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Orito v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 161, 197
N.W.2d 763 (1972).
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of the contents of the books.135 The advertising of a film as "X-rated-
Potentially offensive to some people" has similarly been held as admissible
on the issue of scienter. 1 36
Material contained in circular and letter advertisements by defendants has
also been admitted to show scienter. In People v. Sikora,13' the defendants
had set up a post office box in a bogus name for the receipt and distribution of
their books. In addition, the defendants prepared and sent out descriptive
flyers soliciting orders.' In affirming the defendants' conviction for violation
of the Illinois obscenity law, the court stated:
Selective's [the partnership defendant] method of doing business could
reasonably be regarded as having been devised to insulate the managing
partner from scienter. Selective apparently regarded its open evasion of
the postal laws as an affirmative asset .... "I
In Womack v. United States,1" ' the defendant's intent to appeal to the
prurient interests of homosexuals was held to be proven by evidence of a card
file containing 40,000 names, a letter written by defendant referring to the
master file as a "permanent sucker list," and another letter in which defendant
wrote: "In 1958, physique fans want their truck driver types already cleaned
up, showered and ready for bed."1 1
While the evidentiary use of titillating advertising, such as in Sikora and
Womack, presents no discernible constitutional or evidentiary problem, it is
submitted that the case is far different where signs which merely warn the
public or attempt to limit access to adults are concerned. In the latter case,
the owner or proprietor is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't. On the
one hand, the use of "limited access" signs are admissible on the issue of
the defendant's scienter. But on the other hand, the proprietor who fails
to implement these signs and warnings runs a considerable risk of being
convicted under a "sale to minors" obscenity law,'42 which in most cases is
more severe in its penalty provisions than the statutes previously discussed.'
An intolerable burden, tantamount in many instances to self-censorship, is
thus placed on the bookseller.
From a reading of the many criminal obscenity prosecutions in various
135 Court v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 683, 188 N.W.2d 475 (1971).
136 Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 189 S.E.2d 324 (1972).
137 32111. 2d 260, 204 N.E.2d 768 (1965).
1I: Id. at 265, 204 N.E.2d at 771. See also United States v. Gudlach, 345 F. Supp. 709,
711 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
139 32 Il. 2d at 267, 204 N.E.2d at 772.
140 294 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
141 Id. at 205.
142 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 235.21-.22 (McKinney 1967).
143 See discussion notes 60-115 infra and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions, the impression is received that circumstantial evidence of scienter
is limited only by the bounds of prosecutorial imagination. Perhaps the
most important (or at least the most consistently used) circumstantial
factor to show scienter is the defendant's ownership of, or proprietary
interest in, the premises." It is clear, however, that the fact of ownership
or interest, standing alone, is not sufficient to show scienter.'45 In Sokolic
v. State," 6 the defendant-president of a book company was convicted of
distributing obscene materials. At trial, the only evidence connecting the
defendant with the alleged offenses was his application to the City of Savannah
for a business license as president of the Coastal Book Mart, Inc., dated July
1, 1969, almost two years prior to the alleged offense. The state had argued
that this evidence was alone sufficient to show scienter under the "continuity
doctrine," whereby a state of affairs once proved to have existed is presumed to
continue unless some cause of change appears. There was no evidence at trial
that the defendant had ever been in the bookstore. On appeal, the Georgia
supreme court reversed the conviction, holding that the continuity doctrine
does not apply to criminal cases, so that the state failed to prove scienter." '
Another circumstantial factor that is frequently found in obscenity cases
in which scienter is discussed is the covers and titles of the books and
magazines in question. Where the cover contains pictures of partially clad or
nude males or females, courts have had little difficulty in finding scienter.'"
The court in State v. Childs1" stated the following on the relationship between
the cover of a book or magazine and proof of scienter:
A seller who displays the cover makes a representation to the public of
the book's contents.... Evidence of what is on the cover is therefore
144 United States v. Ewing, 445 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1971); Bullard v. State, 252 Ark.
806, 481 S.W.2d 363 (1972); People v. Adler, 25 Cal. App. 3d 24, 101 Cal. Rptr. 726
(1972); People v. Sarnblad, 26 Col. App. 3d 801, 103 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1972); State
v. Onorato, 2 Conn. Cir. 428, 199 A.2d 715 (1963); Kaplan v. United States, 277 A.2d
477 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); Blue Island v. Onorato, 2 Conn. Cir. 428, 199 A.2d 715
(1963); State v. Eakes, 206 N.W.2d 272 (S.D. 1973); Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va.
113, 189 S.E.2d 324 (1972).
145See People v. Andrews, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1, 100 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1972). But see State
v. I. & M. Amusements, Inc., 10 Ohio App. 2d 153, 226 N.E.2d 567 (1966), where the
court held a corporation criminally liable on agency principles for the acts of its
employees in exhibiting an obscene film. The court stated that "The knowledge of an
agent acting within the scope of his employment will be attributed to the corporation
in the ordinary operation of a motion picture theater." Id. at 274.
146 228 Ga. 788, 187 S.E.2d 822 (1972).
147 See also Fishman v. State, 128 Ga. App. 505, 197 S.E.2d 467 (1973).
148 United States v. Hochman, 277 F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1960); Blue Island v. DeVilbios,
41 111. 2d 135, 242 N.E.2d 761 (1969); State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1965);
State v. Jungelaus, 176 Neb. 641,126 N.W.2d 858 (1964).
149 252 Ore. 91,447 P.2d 304 (1968).
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relevant to a seller's knowledge of the contents. The cover and back
are a form of circumstantial evidence which would be relevant even
in the absence of a statute."'
The titles of and lurid statements on the front and back covers
of publications have likewise been held to be circumstantial evidence of
scienter."' In State v. Shapiro,' the court, in discussing the titles of over 270
books and magazines seized from the defendant's bookstore, stated that: "A
perusal of the titles set forth in the schedule would indicate, without more, that
an adequate showing of scienter was present."''
The physical condition and selling price of the item might also be of
considerable importance on the issue of scienter. The fact that the allegedly
obscene material is stapled shut or wrapped in cellophane has been held, in
conjunction with other factors previously discussed, to permit the inference
that the defendant was aware of the contents of the book. "' And a similar
result has occurred where the court found that the publication in question
was selling at an obviously exorbitant price.155
Several cases demonstrate unique prosecutorial inventiveness in proving
scienter in obscenity prosecutions. In Cain v. Commonwealth,' the state
introduced testimony that, prior to the showing of an allegedly obscene film
at the defendants' theatre, the defendants had: (1) changed the mode of
operation of the theatre, including the alteration of its showing hours; and,
(2) made cuts in the film. The Kentucky court of appeals held that this
evidence was relevant to the issue of the defendants' knowledge of the nature
of the film, and affirmed the convictions.
And in United States v. Rubin, 5 ' a prosecution for shipping obscene
material in interstate commerce, the court held that the scienter of the
defendant had been sufficiently proven by testimony of the defendant's attempt
to exercise dominion and control over the freight shipment of allegedly
obscene films, and his flight from a freight terminal after an unsuccessful
attempt to pick up the films. The court held that the logical inference to be
1 0 1d. at 309.
151 See, e.g., United States v. Hochman, 277 F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1966) (titles included
Sex Factory and Virgins Come High); People v. Finkelstein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 183 N.E.2d
661, 229 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1960) (titles were Queen Bee and Garden of Evil, coupled with
titillating statements on front cover).
152 122 N.J. Super. 409, 300 A.2d 595 (1973).
5'3 122 N.J. Super. 413, 300 A.2d at 599, n.1.154 Court V. State, 51 Wis. 2d 683, 188 N.E.2d 475 (1971).
155 See Orito v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 161, 197 N.W.2d 763 (1972) ($3.50 for a 22-page
publication). See also United States v. Hochman, 277 F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1960) ($3.00).
156 437 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969), rev'd per curiam, 397 U.S. 319 (1970).
157 312 F. Supp. 950 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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drawn from the defendant's attempted dominion and control was that he
knew the content of the packages.'58
DEFENSES
In general, defendants charged with criminal obscenity violations have
sought acquittal, insofar as scienter is concerned, by:
(1) Attacking the constitutionality of the statute or ordinance under
which they were charged; or,
(2) Attacking the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to a showing
of scienter.
For the most part, as has been seen, these attacks have been unsuccessful.
The presence of more than one of the circumstantial facts previously
discussed... has been held to warrant an inference that the defendant was
aware of the contents and/or character of the material.
Obviously, since no conviction can be obtained, regardless of scienter, if
the material itself is not obscene, a defense challenging the legal obscenity
of the item in question frequently appears in the cases. A holding that the
material is not obscene will obviate any discussion of scienter. But courts
will "see through" attempts by distributors or publishers to disguise or disclaim
obscenity by commingling obscene material with other material which has no
logical relationship, but has some social value. An amusing example of this
effort was provided by the court in People v. Bloss,"'6 wherein the court
discussed publications of erotic photographs containing a line drawing of a
nude attributed to Michaelangelo, Matisse, or some other great master about
every tenth page.11 A defendant cannot insulate himself from a finding of
scienter by reliance on such thinly disguised efforts of his publisher or printer.
Nor does it appear that a defense based upon the advice of counsel as to
the non-obscenity of the material will be sufficient to insulate a defendant
from criminal liability.16 The infrequency of use of this argument suggests
the extreme reluctance of attorneys to advise their clients on a matter as
ethereal as the obscenity or non-obscenity of a particular item.
It might be recalled that in Smith the plurality expressly left open the
158 See also Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967).
159 See notes 134-58 supra and accompanying text.
160 27 Mich. App. 687, 184 N.W.2d 299 (1970).
181 Id. at 696, 184 N.W.2d at 308. Also discussed by the court was an exhibit of a "girlie
magazine" which offered its readers a recipe for a hot dog sauce which could be prepared
simply by mixing ketchup and mustard. The recipe was offered along with 30 photo-
graphs of nudes lounging around a swimming pool. Id.
162 Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 502 F.2d 419
(1974).
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question of whether "honest mistake" would preclude a finding of scienter in a
criminal obscenity prosecution.163 Again, although this defense has not appeared
frequently in the cases, it appears that at least one federal circuit... and one
state1 have accepted "honest mistake" as a valid defense to a finding of scienter.
Another possible defense suggested by one case is the defense of "diligent
inquiry." In Woodrufi v. State,"' the defendant, the owner-proprietor of a
small store in College Park, Maryland, was charged with the knowing
possession of obscene matter with intent to sell. The defendant's store
specialized in the sale of leather goods, posters and other objects of interest to
young people, including underground newspapers. The allegedly obscene
publication in question was the Washington Free Press. Approximately nine
months before his arrest, the defendant had learned of the difficulties that the
paper had encountered in an adjoining county (where he owned another store)
and had discontinued the sale of the Free Press in that county pursuant to the
advice of local authorities. However, the defendant continued selling the Free
Press at his College Park store after contacting authorities there and learning
that no action was contemplated against the paper or any other underground
newspapers. The defendant's conviction was reversed by the Maryland Appel-
late Court, which noted the diligent efforts the defendant had made to ascertain
whether the publication was objectionable. However, the court also found
absent any "suspicious circumstances" from which scienter could be inferred.6 7
A mere showing by the state of a tangential connection between the
defendant and the acts allegedly constituting the violation will not be sufficient
to prove scienter. Thus, in People v. Buckley," 8 the court reversed the convic-
tion of the president of the printing company which printed the magazine
Screw, on the grounds that his relation to the publication was too attenuated to
show or infer scienter.' 9 And in United States v. Astore, 7° a federal appellate
court reversed the conviction of a defendant who was charged with interstate
transportation of obscene material, on the grounds that mere proof that the
defendant was a passenger in a car containing obscene materials, coupled with
163 See note 32 supra.
164 United States v. West Coast News Company, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd on
other grounds, sub. nom Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967). The Sixth Circuit
approved of an instruction which would have required a finding of not guilty if the
defendant was honestly mistaken as to the contents of any book or books. 357 F.2d at 862.
165 State v. Lett, 114 Ohio App. 414, 178 N.E.2d 96 (1961). But see Cincinnati v. King,
168 N.E.2d 633 (Cincinnati Mun. Ct. 1960).
11 11 Md. App. 202, 273 A.2d 436 (1971).
1 7 Id. at 218, 273 A.2d at 450.
'"'1 65 Misc. 2d 917, 320 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1971).
169 See also Luros v. United States, 389 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1968), where the court held
that proof of defendant's role in approving and actual editing of the manuscripts
submitted was not of itself actionable.
" 288 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1961).
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the defendant's claim that he was unaware of the contents of the packages
or the purposes of the trip, raised a reasonable doubt as to his scienter.'
CONCLUSION
While it is beyond cavil that obscenity is not entitled to first amendment
protection and that the states may constitutionally regulate obscene material, the
crucial problem occurs in balancing the states' method of regulating obscenity
with the first amendment rights of those citizens whom the regulation affects.
To date, the scienter requirement of Smith has been uniformly interpreted
as permitting an obscenity conviction on the grounds that the defendant was in
some manner aware of the contents of the material he was charged with selling,
exhibiting or distributing. This standard is entirely subjective, and most often
is satisfied by the offering into evidence of a variety of circumstantial factors
which courts feel are in some way probative of scienter.
The burden that this approach places on the citizenry is intolerable, and
stems not from the fact that the result in any criminal obscenity prosecution is
unpredictable, but from the fact that, at least insofar as scienter is concerned,
a judicial or jury finding that scienter was present is almost a certainty. The
decisions in the scienter area could indeed be collated into a handbook for
prosecutorial success in proving scienter.
It is submitted that the Smith requirement of scienter can be consistently
and constitutionally balanced with freedom of expression only by a require-
ment that proof of scienter depends upon a showing that the defendant knew
that the material was "legally obscene." Only upon proof of actual knowledge
that the material in question was legally obscene will the constitutional
dangers inherent in the scienter-obscenity area be obviated.
It has been suggested " 2 that the utilization of declaratory judgment
or book libel proceedings by booksellers and theatre owners to determine
the obscenity of material could be one method of determining in advance legal
obscenity by adjudication. Following the adjudication of obscenity of a
particular book, play, or movie, notice of such finding could be distributed
to others in the local community,"' and upon proof of receipt of such notice
a finding of actual knowledge could be predicated. The major deficiency in this
procedure is that it would place the primary burden of seeking a legal
determination of obscenity in the first instance on the individual. This
undertaking would be burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive, and it is
extremely doubtful that it would be extensively utilized.
171 The defendant here was 67 years old, retired, unemployed and in ill health. These
facts may have tempered the decision somewhat.
172 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 9, at 106-07.
173 The area of distribution would of necessity be continued to a "local community," and
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A more practical solution would be to provide for the enactment of
"obscenity notice" statutes, in which the state (or a political division thereof)
would have the burden of initiating obscenity adjudication proceedings, with
adequate notice and representation, against any allegedly obscene material.
Following this adjudication, notice could then be given to any individual
selling or distributing the material, and a criminal obscenity conviction would
result only if the material was thereafter distributed to the public. The
advantage of this procedure is that it would eliminate the self-censorship
of allegedly obscene materials, while at the same time protect the state's
interest in the control of obscene material. And while this scheme would be no
less expensive, the expense could be placed where it belongs-on the state. As
has been seen, such statutes have been enacted and successfully implemented."7 '
In Stanley v. Georgia,' the United States Supreme Court held that
freedom of expression "[I]s so fundamental to our scheme of individual
liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease the administra-
tion of otherwise valid criminal laws."' 6 The conscientious adoption of
this rationale mandates the elimination of total reliance on circumstantial
evidence to prove scienter in obscenity prosecutions.
JAMES P. EDMISTON
Northern Kentucky Law School
such notice would probably not have a conclusive effect if given to one outside the local
community. See Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
174 See notes 111-15 supra and accompanying text.
"' 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
17t, Id. at 567-68.
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